

SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE EXTERMINATING ANGEL A DELEUZO GUATTARIAN CRITIQUE

S.M.Mahboob-ul-Hassan Bukhari
Department of Philosophy
University of Karachi, Karachi

Abstract

Deleuze thinks that capitalism functions immanently. Capitalism has provided liberation from traditional practices and bondage. People are not bound to their family, religion or land lord in capitalism. They are free to move as they please provided they can afford it. Deleuze points out the dual impact of capitalism. On the one hand, it prevents traditional forms of oppression; on the other hand it brings the liberated forms into the prison of capitalist order. When capitalism decodes it is liberating whereas when it recodes it enslaves. Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari hold, is a way out.

Capitalism decodes and deterritorializes, it reaches a limit at which it must artificially reterritorialize by augmenting the state apparatus, and repressive bureaucratic and symbolic regimes. The schizophrenic never reaches such a limit. It resists such reterritorialization, just as it resists the symbolic and despotic territorialization of the oedipalizing psychotherapist. Deleuze and Guattari disagree with Jameson's argument that schizophrenia reinforces and contributes to the hegemony of capitalism. Instead Deleuze and Guattari see schizophrenic as capitalism's exterminating angel. The schizo is a radical, revolutionary nomadic wanderer who resists all forms of oppressive powers. Schizophrenic sensibilities can replace ideological and dogmatic political goals with a radical form of political desire. Desiring production marks the schizophrenic potential in everyone to resist the power of despotic signifiers and capitalist reterritorialization.

The present paper seeks to evaluate the problem of the schizophrenic's transcendence from capitalism. Can the schizophrenic survive without capital? Deleuze conceived schizoid as an expression of liberation from the oppressive structures of capitalism. For this he developed a new ontology and metaphysics of becoming-other or pure difference. This presumes immanence rather than transcendence. This paper is divided into the following sections:

- a. Becoming and Immanence
- b. Machinic Ontology
- c. Capitalism and Immanence
- d. Freedom and Becoming
- e. Schizophrenia: an exterminating angle
- f. Critical evaluation

The first section seeks to explore the rules of becoming which will lead to the formulation of machinic ontology in second section. The third will throw light on capitalism in the context of capitalism which will reinforce freedom. The fifth section will show the external limit of capitalism which will subsequently be critically evaluated. This will excavate the possibility of freedom in schizophrenic model which was absent in capitalism.

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a. Becoming and Immanence

Deleuze writes in "*Nietzsche and Philosophy*", "The idea of another world, of a supersensible world in all its forms (God, essence, the good, truth), the idea of values superior to life, is not one example among many but the constitutive element of all fiction (Deleuze 1983, p147). He is indicating the parameters of his philosophy of difference in the above mentioned statement. For him, transcendence is fiction and will not be the framework through which he will philosophize. Instead he chooses immanence. Being is not something other than the world we live in. It is that world which will be navigated through Deleuzean philosophy. Moreover,

temporal thinking is yet another parameter. Temporal thinking can penetrate that world to show us what those appearances might be made of, and how they might become different. For Deleuze, to conceive living is to conceive both what is and what might be. In an ontology worthy of the name, the two are entwined. The world is more than we may realize. It is rich with difference.

In mainstream philosophy, the project of ontology has always been to focus upon what is? So far as what might be has been ignored. Only at the margins, according to Deleuze, have there been figures that have offered a different vision. Spinoza, Bergson, and Nietzsche are among them, presenting us with concepts from which we might build a new ontology, one that does not reinforce a tired conformism but points the way toward a more open, vibrant conception of the world and of living in it (May2005,p71). Deleuze traces a new ontology, a new way of conceiving being, the world, or what there is. Instead of abandoning the questions of being that have been badly posed by so many of the philosophical ancestors, he chooses to raise them again, but to pose them differently. Being is not a puzzle to be solved but a problem to be engaged in. It is to be engaged through a thought that moves as comfortably among problems as it does among solutions, as fluidly among differences as it does among identities. The world as Deleuze conceives it is a living world, a vital world (May2005, p71).

Deleuze is inspired by three philosophers to formulate an ontology of difference. These three thinkers are Spinoza Bergson and Nietzsche. He carries out experiments with their thought which would eventually lead him to liberation. Deleuze acknowledges that “Spinoza is the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers are hardly more than apostles who distance themselves or draw near this mystery” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p60). He draws immanence from Spinoza, duration from Bergson, and affirmation from Nietzsche. He sets these concepts as the standard for his ontology of difference.

Ontology, according to Deleuze, becomes the first requirement of the ontology of difference. Philosophy can no longer

function on the presumption of transcendence. Deleuze & Guatarri write “We must draw up a list of . . . illusions and take their measure, just as Nietzsche, following Spinoza, listed the ‘four great errors.’ But the list is infinite. First of all there is the *illusion of transcendence*, which, perhaps, comes before all the others” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p49). Deleuze argues that transcendence requires two presumptions. First, the existence of at least two ontological substances. Second, one of these two substances be superior to the other. This superiority is presumed both in power and value. One substance gives rise to the other. The former provides life to the other. The transcended substance depends upon the transcending substance for its origin. The transcending power brings the world into full swing, liberating it from the prison of its incapacity and its impotence. The commitment to transcendence is to allow the universe to be explained in such a way as to privilege one substance at the expense of other, to reserve the superiority of certain features and to denigrate others. Todd May notes that “what is important for Deleuze’s thought is what is to be denigrated: the physical, the chaotic, that which resists identity. Physicality, chaos, difference that cannot be subsumed into categories of identity: all these must deny themselves if they would seek to be recognized in the privileged company of the superior substance” (May 2005, p31). The commitments of transcendence, to two substances and to a privileging of one of them, lead us to the questions of the interaction between the two substances. Spinoza fascinates Deleuze as he had successfully changed the subject of transcendence by the concept of expression. According to Deleuze, emanation has an affinity with expression; “they produce while remaining in themselves” (Deleuze 1990, 171). However, this affinity of emanation with expression does not bring any important changes in the picture. In emanation what is transcended remains distinct and different from the creator. Moreover, the transcending substance enjoys privilege with regard to its creator. Deleuze expresses it as “Emanation thus serves as the principle of a universe rendered hierarchical . . . each term is as it were the image of the superior term that precedes it, and is defined by the degree of distance that separates it from the first cause or the first principle”(Deleuze 1990, p173). Hence emanation carries the two

commitments of transcendence: the existence of two substances and the superiority of one of those substances to the other : “the themes of creation or emanation cannot do without a minimal transcendence, which bars ‘expressionism’ from proceeding all the way to the immanence it implies” (Deleuze 1990, p180). Spinoza’s contribution lies, according to Deleuze, in the construction of an ontology of immanence.

The ontology of immanence requires the univocity of being. Deleuze writes “expressive immanence can not be sustained unless it is accompanied by a thoroughgoing conception of univocity, a thoroughgoing affirmation of univocal being” (Deleuze 1990, p178). The substance of being is one and indivisible which amounts to be saying that all hierarchy and division is banished from ontology. By univocity of being , Deleuze means that “the term “being” or “Being” is said in one and the same sense of everything of which it is said” (May 2005,p34). By the introduction of univocity of being Deleuze is able to get rid of transcendence. According to him, it is only through the rigorous commitment to the univocity of being that an ontology can be created. “The significance of Spinozism seems to me to be this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. . . . And such a result can be obtained only within a perspective of univocity” (Deleuze 1990, p180). Univocity of being leads to equality of all beings.

Substance expresses itself in attributes. Among the attributes accessible to human consciousness are the only two: thought and extension. Deleuze writes, “Attributes are, for Spinoza, dynamic and active forms. And here at once we have what seems essential: attributes are no longer attributed, but they are in some sense “attributive.” . . . As long as we conceive the attribute as something attributed, we thereby conceive a substance of the same species or genus; such a substance . . . is dependent on the goodwill of a transcendent God . . . On the other hand, as soon as we posit the attribute as “attributive” we conceive it as attributing its essence to something that remains identical for all attributes, that is, to necessarily existing

substance” (Deleuze 1990, p45). Substance expresses itself in attributes. Attributes are not things that *emanate* from substance. Instead they are substance expressing itself. “What do [attributes] attribute, what do they express? Each attribute attributes an infinite essence, that is, an unlimited quality” (Deleuze 1990, p45). “For Deleuze, Todd May writes, “there are two differences between this picture of the relation of substance and attributes and Spinoza’s. First, substance is woven into the attributes that express it. Second, substance is not like a thing that gives birth to other things. It is more like a process of expression (May 2005, p37).

According to Deleuze, substance has a temporal character. It is bound up with time. Substance must be seen as a process not as a finished product. May explicates “Substance folds, unfolds, and refolds itself in its attributes and in its modes, to which it remains immanent. It is always substance that, in folding and unfolding itself, remains within these folds. Being is univocal: there is no distinction between layers, levels, or types of being. There is no transcendence, only immanence (May 2005, p38). Deleuze elaborates being as “Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself (Deleuze 1994, p36).

Deleuze develops his conception of immanence through Spinoza. Three concepts allow Deleuze to philosophize immanence. They are: the univocity of being, immanence, and expression. Deleuze argues that to think in terms of univocity, immanence, and expression is to reject the division of being into natural kinds. This scheme of thought also opens up the horizon of a thought that embraces both its temporal fluidity and its resistance to rigid classification. Hence Deleuze makes submission, copying and judgment of to transcendent being unthinkable logically or metaphysically. This is what makes Spinoza, according to Deleuze, the Christ of philosophers. Deleuze’s Spinoza speaks “To be is *to express oneself, to express something else, or to be expressed*” (Deleuze 1990, p 253). To explore the character of being’s expression; Deleuze draws from Bergson’s conception of time. He holds that the expression of being is temporal.

Deleuze argues that Spinoza's immanence and Bergson's duration can be brought together in constructing a philosophy that allows seeing living more vitally than ever before. Deleuze thinks that expression occurs temporal temporally. He needs a concept of time which facilitates his "expression" of being. His expression, he contends, can't operate with circular, linear, or existentialist conceptions of time.

Linear conception of time is inconsistent, since it functions and operates at the model of transcendence. Linear time is regarded as a container (a spatial term) in which things take place. It serves as a narrative form through which modern life is organized. Circular view of time's basic slogan is 'history repeats itself'. Things once happened will occur and recur over and over again just like the repetition of the seasons.

Expression may find its home in the existentialist view of time. What begins in the past expresses itself in the future through the present. The future becomes an expression of the past which is not mere repetition but that unfolds it, or folds it, or refolds it. Deleuze is uncomfortable with the existential conception of time. Because existential approach emphasizes or conceived at all or presumes the human. This approach is subjectively grounded. What provides the future its privilege as a dimension of time is that "we" humans, who are characterized by our aims, objectives, projects, by the goals and aspirations we (humans) place before ourselves. It is "we" the humans who are defined by our futures. This way of defining time is to put it in the salvage of human beings. The existentialist conception of time denies, according to Deleuze, the multiplicity of the "one". It freezes the "one" into a humanistic model.

Deleuze argues that this is not done by mistake but by design. He doesn't seek to create an ontology centered on human ambitions and perceptions or human orientation toward the world. He seeks to conceive temporality in a way that both captures the human living of time and does not subordinate and subsume all of temporality to human living. "It is only to the extent that movement is grasped as belonging to things as much as to

consciousness that it ceases to be confused with psychological duration, whose point of application it will displace, thereby necessitating that things participate directly in duration itself (Deleuze 1988, p48).

This conception of time reinforces and extends the concept of immanence; it allows a way to comprehend how expression happens. If expression is temporal, then temporality requires to be conceived temporally rather than spatially. The concept of *duration* (*duree*) facilitates us to do that.

Deleuze writes “The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass. . . . The past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass” (Deleuze 1988, p59). The present passes. In order for this to take place, there must *be* a past for the present to pass into. The past must exist as certainly as does the present. The past does not exist in the similar way as the present. Bergson conceives it as existing in a very different way. He holds that it exists in virtuality, in contrast to the actuality of the present.

Deleuze argues “Strictly speaking, the psychological is the present. Only the present is ‘psychological’; but the past is pure ontology; pure recollection has only ontological significance” (Deleuze 1988, p56). Bergson’s concept of the past is the ontological source from which psychological memory springs. There is one past, a single past in which all psychological memory participates. The past does not exist in the similar fashion as the present does. The present exists in *actuality*. The past, the ontological past, exists *virtually*.

Deleuze thinks that virtual is as real as the actual. The distinction between the virtual and the actual is different from the distinction between the possible and the real. Deleuze draws two differences between virtual and possible. First, the possible does not exist, where as the virtual does. It is real. “*The virtual is real*

in so far as it is virtual." (Deleuze1994, p208) The second difference, according to him, is that the possible is a mirror of the real, while the virtual does not mirror the actual. Hence he concludes that the past is altogether different from the present. It is structured differently. Substance actualizes itself in attributes and modes. Its way of being as the virtual is not simply the representation or imitation of its way of being. This distinction (actual/virtual) facilitates Deleuze to distance himself from transcendent ways of thinking. The ideas of model and copy and of resemblance carry transcendence in themselves which leads to the denigration of existent things. Deleuze rejects this denigration of existent things. Deleuze seeks to create such an ontology which judges existence immanently without presuming any kind of transcendence. This distinction (actual/virtual) paves the way for this. The virtual is the part of the real in a very similar fashion as actuality is.

To live is to comprehend a historically given world which is not of one's own making. The past exists in me in such a way that it appears at each moment of my engagement with the world. Here in this engagement with the world that the actualization of virtual occurs. The past and present are mingled. The past unfolds whereas the present creates and invents. Present always actualises the past. At every moment the past actualizes. "In this way a psychological unconscious, distinct from the ontological unconscious, is defined. The latter corresponds to a recollection that is pure, virtual, impassive, inactive, *in itself*. The former represents the movement of recollection in the course of actualizing itself" (Deleuze 1988, p71). The actualizing past exists ontologically and psychologically. Both the psychological and ontological are inseparable. It is a process in which substance expresses itself. The past is viewed and colored by things which logically had no connection with it. The past is not something which had happened or is over. Deleuze contends "What characterizes duration is not logical connection; nor is it relation among similar elements, nor is it identification or imitation or resemblance. It is difference that characterizes duration: "Duration *is that which differs with itself*"(Deleuze1956,p88). The past which is duration,

according to Deleuze, is characterized by a particular kind of difference, a kind of difference that is irreducible to the categories of Identity.

The past is not composed of identical elements. Hence it has not any particular identity. The past *differs with itself*. Deleuze thinks of difference in terms of temporality. All differences like Hegelian oppositions or identity resemblances are spatial and hence are away from reality. Deleuze sometimes calls “multiplicity” for difference. He writes that “there are two types of multiplicity. One is represented by space . . . It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of *difference in degree*; it is a numerical multiplicity, *discontinuous and actual*. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of *difference in kind*; it is a *virtual and continuous* multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers” (Deleuze 1988, p38). Deleuze highlights that the problem is “People have seen only differences in degree where there are differences in kind” (Deleuze 1988, p23). Hence “the Bergsonian revolution is clear: We do not move from the present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past to the present, from recollection to perception” (Deleuze 1988, p63). Deleuze urges us to think temporally rather than spatially because this will allow virtual differences to make more sense. The present is not simply an ideal now, but a surplus beyond what is directly experienced. The present is always more than it reveals to us. The virtual difference is immanent to the present.

Ontology, for Deleuze, is not limited to the study of stable, frozen, fixed identities of things but extends to what unsettles and destabilize it. The present is more than what it appears to be. Virtual differences are immanent in it. His ontology illustrates the overflowing nature of reality. Deleuze usually states that one does not know what the body is capable of. It is not transcendence and spatiality that are the proper terms and adequate vocabulary for ontological thinking. It is immanence and temporality by which, Deleuze thinks, transcendence and spatiality can be overcome.

Deleuze admires Nietzsche as “Marx and Freud, perhaps do represent the dawn of our culture, but Nietzsche is something entirely different: the dawn of counterculture” (Deleuze 1977, p142). Deleuze uses another term from the history of philosophy: eternal return. This was earlier used by Nietzsche. Eternal return is not taken in usual context and meaning as Deleuze often does. He gives different meanings to the conventional terms. Eternal return doesn’t mean the cycling back of the same things over the course of time. “According to Nietzsche the eternal return is in no sense a thought of the identical but rather a thought of synthesis, a thought of the absolutely different . . . It is not the ‘same’ or the ‘one’ which comes back in the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs (Deleuze 1983, p46). Return is the return of difference. He further elaborates it “*Return is the being of that which becomes*. Return is the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming”(Deleuze 1983,p24). According to Deleuze, becoming is real which is becoming multiplicity. Deleuze argues “for there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity; neither multiplicity nor becoming are appearances or illusions. . . . Multiplicity is the inseparable manifestation, essential transformation and constant symptom of unity. Multiplicity is the affirmation of unity; becoming is the affirmation of being” (Deleuze 1983, pp23-4). Substance is not a constant and persistent identity that stands behind the modes and attributes. It is becoming and difference. Duration is difference. May elaborates “It is difference, difference that may actualize itself into specific identities, but that remains difference even within those identities (May 2005, p60). Return is the being of becoming and difference. It is the difference that recurs or returns eternally.

For Deleuze, the Past is never gone or over. He writes “The passing moment could never pass if it were not already past and yet to come – at the same time as being present” (Deleuze1983,p48). Duration is unity of past, present and future. They are interwoven. What returns is the virtuality which is behind as well as within those identities. Deleuze explicates “It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that

constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes. It is not some one thing which returns but rather returning itself is the one thing which is affirmed of diversity or multiplicity. In other words, identity in the return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs (Deleuze 1983, p48). The future is full to overflowing. It is not empty and always recurs in the form of virtual differences. Todd May notes “The past is duration; the present is actualization; the future is eternal return. But within all these, constitutive of them, is difference. Difference in kind constitutes duration. Actualized difference constitutes the present. The return of difference constitutes the future (May 2005, p62).

Deleuze discusses the dice throw as “the game has two moments which are those of a dice throw – the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. . . . The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of *chance*, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of *necessity*” (Deleuze1983, p25-6). The future is the eternal return which is nothing but the return of difference. The future is virtual difference that is waiting to actualize itself into a particular present. This is the throw of the dice. It is mere chance. The future, too, actualizes itself in a present, as does the past. May writes “The return crystallizes into identities. Pure temporality becomes also spatiality. We are faced with a particular situation that has emerged from the multiplicity that has returned. That is the combination, the dice that falls back. It is necessity” (May 2005, p63). Necessity does not mean things had to happen in that particular way and not otherwise. The present is not guided by any transcendence to materialize any particular future. Deleuze intends to overturn this thinking that this particular future will become present and not otherwise. Todd May points out three faults in it. “First, it implies that the future is constituted by particular identities, instead of being a virtual multiplicity of the kind Bergson conceives. Second, it implies that that future exists as a possibility before it becomes a reality, whereas Deleuze contrasts possibility with virtuality. Third, it implies guidance, which seems to require transcendence rather than immanence. In immanence, there is folding, unfolding, refolding. But there is no guiding force, no invisible hand” (May 2005, p63).

The eternal return is the throw of dice. They are always thrown, at every moment, at every instant. The future is always with us in a similar way as the past is. A pair of dice is thrown with the multiplicity which is duration. The dice fall back. They show a combination. The past is always a part of every present. “The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable. He posits this combination itself as an end to be obtained, hidden behind causality” (Deleuze 1983, p26-7). Deleuze urges to affirm chance and necessity. He thinks that bad players seek particular combinations. Good players do not seek particular future. He writes “But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known – this is the certainty necessary to play well” (Deleuze 1983, p27). Good players do not play for a particular combination. They play knowingly that the combinations are infinite, and are not up to them. Deleuze writes “*To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives.* To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but *to create* new values which are those of life, which make life light and active. There is creation, properly speaking, only insofar as we can make use of excess in order to invent new forms of life rather than separating life from what it can do (Deleuze 1983, p185). To affirm, Deleuze argues, is to carry out experiments without any prior knowledge about the results of one’s experimenting. In this way the virtual will be excavated.

Deleuze argues that things are composed of forces: active and reactive. “Every force which goes to the limit of its power is . . . active” (Deleuze 1983, p59). An active force goes to the limit of what it is able to do. It does whatever is in its power and capacity to the extent of its ability. Active forces are creative and productive to make whatever can be made of themselves. All creativity is conducting experiment. Creativity may be channeled in undermined unexpected directions. One throws the dice without knowing what will fall back. Reactive forces

“proceed in an entirely different way – they decompose; *they separate active force from what it can do*; they take away a part or almost all of its power (Deleuze 1983, p57). Reactive forces undermine active forces. They do not produce; they limit the creativity of active forces.

We, Deleuze argues, are composed of forces which seek to go the limit of what they can do, and forces that seek to separate those forces from what they can do. His view is that Active forces affirm difference and lead to productivity. Deleuze urges that Good players of dice affirm active forces and affirm chance and necessity, the difference that is both past and future and the actualization of difference. To affirm the eternal return is to recognize a world of virtual difference which is behind and beyond the particularities of our present which will set free the active forces of creativity and productivity to refuse to separate those forces from what they can do.

To sum up Spinoza, Bergson, and Nietzsche provide the three concepts which, after interpretation, allow Deleuze to formulate his dynamic, instable, temporal, immanent ontology. These three concepts are: immanence, duration, and the affirmation of difference. These concepts make the ontology of difference possible and bring its overflowing nature to the fore. This also makes the three concepts: submission, copying and judgment illogical and metaphysically impossible.

h Machinic Ontology

Deleuze conceives politics on the basis of a more fluid ontology, one that would allow for political change and experimentation on a variety of levels, rather than privileging one level or another. In their collaborative work Deleuze and Guattari offer a variety of starting places. One of the concepts they rely on the most is that of the *machine*. “Everywhere *it* [what Freud called the id] is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. . . . we are all handymen: each with his little machines.”(Deleuze & Guattari

1977, p1). The concept of machines provide them ontological mobility, and through which they can overthrow the dogmatic image of political thought. Claire Colebrook writes “In *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari use a terminology of machines, assemblages, connections and productions. . . . “An *organism* is a bounded whole with an identity and an end. A *mechanism* is a closed machine with a specific function. A *machine*, however, is nothing more than its connections; it is not made by anything, is not for anything, and has no closed identity (Colebrook 2002, p56). An organism is a whole which is self-regulating. Each of its parts supports others in such a way that in the harmony of those parts make whole. We should think of being as mobile machines that may connect to the environment in a variety of ways. There is no transcendent unit of analysis. To think machinically is to consider the relation of individuals to society as only one level of connections. There are others to be considered. One can also discuss pre-individual connections and supra-individual connections. These connections may be discerned in their fluidity.

Machinic connections are productive and creative. Deleuze and Guattari compare machinic connections in *Anti-Oedipus* with psychoanalytic thinking. For psychoanalysis, desire is a lack. It is conceived in terms of lack. I desire what I want what I do not have. If I think of desire machinically, however, it will replace lack with creativity. Desire is a creator of connections, not a lack. To desire is to connect, create and produce with others. These connections can be formed sexually, politically, athletically, gastronomically, and vocationally. “The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of an anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine, an anal machine, a talking-machine, or a breathing machine (asthma attacks)” (Deleuze & Guattari 1977, p1). Machines create through connections but not in a pre-given fashion. Machines create in unpredictable and often novel ways. Machines are mobile creators of connections. These connections are irreducible to any one set of connections, any particular identity. Even when they are connected in a specific way they are capable of other connections and other functions.

Machines are irreducible to their actual connections. There is a virtuality in machinic connections that inheres in any set of actual connections and that allows them to connect in other and novel ways. Todd May writes “The virtual character of machines, their mobility as machines and the mobility of the concept *machine*, does not come from their transcendent character” (May 2005, p126). The mobility of machines can not be upheld without their connectivity. Machines are no longer machines outside of its connections. It is perhaps within machinic connections that machines are capable of producing other connections. “We define social formations by *machinic processes* and not by modes of production (these on the contrary depend on the processes) (Deleuze & Guatarri 1987, p435). There is no organizing element to “desiring machines” that dictates particular modes of connections from outside or above. The *machine* is a concept that can be developed to form a Deleuzian political ontology. This concept allows Deleuze to distance himself from the dogmatic image of thought which he believes structures liberal political theory.

To accept the concept of the machine is to shift from a focus on the macropolitical to the micropolitical and to move from the molar to the molecular. This move is inevitable in order to apprehend how power works and how we are constructed. For this, however, we must turn from the grand scale to the smaller scale. Deleuze and Guattari write, “the molecular, or microeconomics, micropolitics, is defined not by the smallness of its elements but by the nature of its ‘mass’ – the quantum flow as opposed to the molar segmented line (Deleuze & Guatarri 1987, p217).

The terms molecular, microploitics must not mislead us. These terms are usually associated with smallness which is inadequate. A quantum flow is a virtual field. It is a machinic process. Genetic information is a quantum flow. Todd May notes “Quantum flows: fluid identities that arise from a chaotic and often unpredictable folding, unfolding, and refolding of matter. Micropolitics is not an issue of the small; it is an issue of quantum flows. It is an issue of machines. To think machinically is to seek

for what escapes them. It means that one seeks for what escapes *from* them and *within* them. What Deleuze calls a *line of flight* is not a leap into another realm; it is a production within the realm of that from which it takes flight" (May 2005, p 128).

Deleuze does not deny the existence of large entities like society. What he intends to establish is the primacy of the machinic. "Everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a *macropolitics* and a *micropolitics*." (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p213). There is both a macropolitics and a micropolitics, but the micropolitics is primary and comes first. Take, for instance, the concept of social class: "social classes themselves imply "masses" that do not have the same kind of movement, distribution, or objectives and do not wage the same kind of struggle. Attempts to distinguish the mass from the class effectively tend toward this limit: the notion of mass is a molecular notion operating according to a type of segmentation irreducible to the molar segmentarity of class. Yet classes are indeed fashioned from masses; they crystallize them. And masses are constantly flowing or leaking from classes" (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p213). He does not deny that there are sexes, national territories and ethnic groups. What he urges is that we must think of these as relative stabilities, as products of machinic processes. These are all constructed through the formation of connections and overspill them from within.

If we start thinking machinically, we begin to see more than what macropolitics shows us. Machines produce connections not only to the state and the economy but also connections that will only be visible if we turn away from traditional political thought. Deleuze does not hold that traditional liberal thought is entirely wrong or self contradictory. The only thing he objects to is the inadequacy of the approach. This inadequacy can only be overcome by machinic metaphysics and rhizomatic epistemology.

The liberal political theory ignores many layers. The first is that the transversal connections- connections that cut across traditional political identities. He writes "imagine that

between *the West and the East* a certain segmentarity is introduced, opposed in a binary machine, arranged in state apparatuses, over coded by an abstract machine as a sketch of a World Order. It is then from *North to South* that the destabilization takes place. . . . A Corsican here, elsewhere a Palestinian, a plane hijacker, a tribal upsurge, a feminist movement, a Green ecologist, a Russian dissident – there will always be someone to rise up to the south (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p131)”. These different connections which are called transversal connections are only conceivable through machinic thinking.

There is another layer to which only machinic thinking will allow us access. We can look at some thing not only from one correct, a historical, transcendent perspective but from other perspectives. This will help us to see different things. The anti globalization movement is a particular type of imbalance cutting across ecosystems that tries to protect or restore particular types of balance among them or within them. The anti globalization movement is, according to Deleuze, a deterritorialization that will allow for a new type of reterritorialization.

There are at least two insights we might get from providing an account that centers on the earth rather than upon individuals. First, it allows us to see that just as the environment is a political matter, politics is an environmental matter. Environmentalism is not only a movement of individuals in relation to the earth but also it is other than that. Since individuals are themselves part of ecosystems, environmentalism is not only a movement *about* ecosystems but also a movement *within* them. Introduction of the earth as a political category facilitates us to understand this. Second, the move from individuals to the earth allows us to get away from traditional political categories. It helps our thought to gain suppleness. This does not mean that we replace the category of the earth for that of individuals in understanding the anti globalization movement. It is not an either/or situation. As Deleuze often writes in his later writings, it is and . . . and . . . and. We are not saying, “No, it’s not about individuals, it’s about the earth.” We are saying, “Yes, it is about individuals, but no more about them than about the earth.” The task is not one of substituting a single set of categories with another set but

to be able to create and move among various sets of categories, and even to cross between them. A political thought of difference recognizes that whatever categories we use, there is always more to experience. We need to be getting ready to switch perspectives in order to experience more.

Deleuze and Guatarri's machinic political approach permits us to open that question from different angles, to see different connections being made at different levels and layers. Rather than taking it for granted that there are particular individuals with particular needs or lacks that the engagement in politics seeks to fulfill needs or interests, political living might consist in the creation of connections within various actualized levels of difference: individuals, the earth. They do not seek to give all encompassing answer that one should live in such and such a fixed way. "There is no general prescription. We have done with all globalizing concepts" (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p141). It is not a question of how we *should* live but it is a question of how we *might* live which is possible in multiple connections.

Machinic thinking is rhizomatic. It provides opportunities for multiple connections from a variety of perspectives that are not grounded in a single concept or macro concepts. Rhizomes operate differently. Todd May elaborates rhizomes as "Kudzu is a rhizome. It can shoot out roots from any point, leaves and stems from any point. It has no beginning: no roots. It has no middle: no trunk. And it has no end: no leaves. It is always in the middle, always in process. There is no particular shape it has to take and no particular territory to which it is bound. It can connect from any part of itself to a tree, to the ground, to a fence, to other plants, to itself" (May 2005, p134). Deleuze and Guatarri write "The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, "and . . . and . . . and . . ." This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb "to be." Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? These are totally useless questions. . . . *Between* things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal

movement that sweeps one *and* the other way, a stream without beginning or end” (Deleuze & Guatarri 1987,p25).

Traditional political thought, according to Deleuze, is arboreal which is structured like a tree. First there is the individual, then the state, then the laws that answer back to the interests of the individual. A tree has particular roots grounded in the soil at a particular place and gives rise to branches and then leaves in a specific way. Arboreal is a system of derivation: first the roots, then the trunk, then the leaves. The roots are rooted here and not elsewhere. The branches are indispensable to the trunk, the leaves to the branches. There is transcendence in this structure which is replaced it with immanent model of rhizome.

c. Immanence and Capitalism

Deleuze and Guatarri after making machinic orientation talk of macro or grand scheme of things like individuals and of the state and of capitalism but. They contend that we are composed of lines. “Whether we are individuals or groups, we are made up of lines and these lines are very varied in nature. The first kind of line which forms us is segmentary – or rigid segmentarity . . .family-profession; job-holiday; family – and then school – and then the army – and then the factory – and then retirement.” (Deleuze & Parnet 1987,p124). They are composed of the categories we recognize. Traditional political theory operates with segmentarity lines. Deleuze denies the exclusive right of segmentarity lines to determine our political thought. He contends that they are rigid. These lines are made of lines of flight. The nature of lines of flight is to overflow. What makes these lines frozen and rigid is not what they contain but what people *think* they contain. Lines of rigid segmentarity appear as rigid. Segmantery lines are more than what they may seem. The difficulty is to grasp this “more” feature of these lines.

Deleuze names lines of rigid segmentarity *molar*. Other lines, he calls, *molecular*: “we have lines of segmentarity which are much more supple, as it were molecular. . . . rather than molar lines with segments, they are molecular fluxes with thresholds or quanta. *A threshold is crossed, which does not necessarily coincide with a segment of more visible lines.* Many things happen on this second kind of line – becomings, micro-becomings, which don’t even have the same rhythm as our “history.” (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p124). Molecular lines allow cutting across the divisions of old political structure. “A profession is a rigid segment, but also what happens beneath it, the connections, the attractions and repulsions, which do not coincide with the segments, the forms of madness which are secret but which nevertheless relate to the public authorities” (Deleuze & Parnet 1987,p125). Under these lines, there is another set of lines: lines of flight. Lines of flight, according to Todd May have two roles to play in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. They determine both molar lines and other types of molecular lines, and they offer other political adventures – and other political dangers (May 2005, p137).

“From the point of view of micropolitics, a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular.” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p 216) Society is defined by a line of flight “which is even more strange: as if something carried us away, across our segments, but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown, not foreseeable, not pre-existent” (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p 125).It looks like an escape, a movement away from something. This amounts to be saying that Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of lines of flight. Lines of flight are the pure differences that lie under the constituted identities of segmentary lines and the partially constituted identities of molecular lines. But they provide the stuff or raw that will be actualized into those identities.

A territorialized line is one that has a specific territory or a code. It has been imprisoned in a particular identity. Territory needs to be identified. Statements need to be made. Identities need to be constituted. People have to live somewhere. It only

becomes the enemy when we resist deterritorialization. Deterritorialization is the chaos under and within the territories. It is due to the lines of flight without which there would be neither code nor change in that code. Lines of flight are the immanent movement of deterritorialization that at once permits there to be a territory and destabilizes the territorial character of any territory. "A Marxist can be quickly recognized when he says that a society contradicts itself, is defined by its contradictions, and in particular by its class contradictions. We would rather say that, in a society, everything flees and that a society is defined by its lines of flight which affect masses of all kinds (here again, "mass" is a molecular notion). A society . . . is defined first by its points of deterritorialization, its fluxes of deterritorialization. (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p 135).

It is not that there are first deterritorialized lines of flight and later settled territories which would subsequently be deterritorialized. There are always both of them at the same time: "the nomads do not precede the sedentaries; rather, nomadism is a movement, a becoming that affects sedentaries, just as sedentarization is a stoppage that settles the nomads." (Deleuze & Guatarri 1987,p430)

The primacy of lines of flight is nothing but material whether territorialised or deterritorialized. It is the primacy of lines of flight that provides the machinic character to Deleuze's political thought. These lines of flight are creative and productive. Lines of flight constitute our living together, a material that forms and reforms itself in our living. Lines of flight along with molecular and segmentary lines are the stuff of our being and the proper focus of political thought. "In any case, the three lines are immanent, caught up in one another. We have as many tangled lines as a hand. We are complicated in a different way from a

hand. What we call by different names – schizoanalysis, micro-politics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography – has no other object than the study of these lines, in groups or in individuals (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p 125).

Deleuze does not view the state as a referee or a mediator of the interests of individual. The state, according to Deleuze & Guatarri, creates resonances. “The State . . . is a phenomenon of *intraconsistency*. It makes points *resonate* together, points that are not necessarily already town poles but very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 433.). To create the resonance is to depend on something that precedes one. The state is parasitic and dependable for its existence. The state is parasitic on lines of flight, molar lines and molecular lines. It draws from the molar lines its nourishment. Deleuze & Guatarri view a state that resonates molar lines. Since these lines have identities and orders. Not only that but also there are abstract machines. Discipline, for instance, is an abstract machine. It brings together multiple and multilayered practices under a specific regime of power. Discipline overcodes the molar lines of a society. Overcoding is the taking of multiple elements of power to pull them together into a particular arrangement that is then applied on large segments of society.

The state reinforces overcoding and allows spread it to all nooks and corners of society. If an abstract machine is built from the resonance of a variety of molar lines, the state allows develop and maintain that abstract machine. “There are no sciences of the State but there are abstract machines which have relationships of interdependence with the State. That is why, on the line of rigid [that is, molar] segmentarity, one must distinguish the *devices of power* which code diverse segments, the *abstract machine* which overcodes them and regulates their relationships and the *apparatus of the State* which realizes this machine (Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p 130)”. The state does not create abstract machines at all but merely realizes them.

Deleuze and Guattari write “The State is not a point taking all the others upon itself, but a resonance chamber for them all.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 224.) Without the state, according to them, it is hard to imagine how an abstract machine could get hold of the variety of practices it does and could be installed in the midst of the complex relations of identity and difference that Deleuze and Guattari think are the material arrangements of any society. The state is a necessary feature of a society that anticipates to bring order through the imposition of uniformity across its surface. The state, Deleuze and Guattari contend, is essentially oppressive and a force for conformity. The state has enormous resources available in the service of a realization of the power of abstract machines and their oppression and conformity. The state maintains discipline. It creates the conditions beneath which abstract machines can reinforce the identity of molar lines and subject them to the same sorts of routines. The state is oppressive, powerful, and parasitic.

The state, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has a strange relationship to capitalism. Their position is ambivalent on capitalism. They ,on the one hand, credit capitalism for removing many past oppressions like overthrowing mechanisms of conformity in earlier European history. On the other hand, they hold, capitalism creates its own damages. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “the old “codes” that have ruled us have been swept away by capitalism. They have been replaced instead by an “axiomatic.” The difference between an axiomatic and the codes it has replaced is described by Deleuze and Guattari this way: the axiomatic deals directly with purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, and which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously; codes, on the other hand, are relative to those domains and express specific relations between qualified elements that cannot be subsumed by a higher formal unity (overcoding) except by transcendence and in an indirect fashion”(Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p 454).

Codes are regulatory concrete principles that regulate particular people’s relationships with other specific people. An

axiomatic is more abstract that regulates, but not through specific rules and not by means of specific relationships. Present day laborers in a capitalist economy are in a very different situation. Laborers can move as they wish provided they can afford it. This does not mean that they are free and liberated. Capitalism has its own specific ways of regulating behavior and interaction. The most prominent among these ways is the dominance of exchange value. Exchange value functions as an axiomatic rather than as a code. It regulates not by setting rules between specific people or among people. The axiomatic is a functional regulator of relationships among multiple people and things and their relationship.

This is not, in Deleuze and Guattari's view, an entirely bad thing. Capitalism deterritorializes and decodes, clearing the ground for new ways of creating lives: "capitalism and its break are defined not solely by decoded flows, but by the generalized decoding of flows, the new massive deterritorialization, the conjunction of deterritorialized flows."(Deleuze & Guattari 1977,p224). Todd May explicates that by "deterritorializing previous territorialities, lines of flight are freed to travel to new territories, intersect with other lines of flight, engage in new experiments (May 2005,p145). According to Deleuze & Guattari Oedipus complex is one way of stifling flight. Oedipus is an abstract machine that operates under capitalism to imprison lines of flight and prevent them creating new ways of living.

Desire is a line of flight which is capable of creating new ways of living. But if its energy is imprisoned by one way or another, its creativity will be blocked. It will be put in the service of the dominant order. In this particular case desire serves the axiomatic of capitalism. Oedipus turns desires towards family. Lines of flight are captured, inhibited from exploiting the deterritorialization that the emergence of capitalism affords. In that way, lines of flight can serve capital rather than freed to pursue other directions. Capitalism maintains its hegemony over the unpredictable adventures that might follow the deterritorialization it has helped foster.

A Thousand Plateaus, the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* was published after eight years of *Anti-Oedipus*: the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Oedipus is no longer a figure in their thought whereas the abstract machine of discipline continues to be recognized as a powerful mechanism binding lines of flight. Deleuze begins to question near the end of his life, whether discipline is still effective as an abstract machine. He appears to be suggesting that we have moved from a society of discipline to a society of control, characterized not by the confinement and regulation of bodies but by “ultra rapid forms of apparently free-floating control that are taking over from the old disciplines at work within the time scales of closed systems” (Deleuze 1995, p. 178). The capitalist axiomatic is directly exploitative. It does not require an intermediary. Deleuze and Guattari write “The four principal flows that torment the representatives of the world economy, or the axiomatic, are the flow of matter-energy, the flow of population, the flow of flood, and the urban flow. The situation seems inextricable because the axiomatic never ceases to create all of these problems, while at the same time its axioms, even multiplied, deny it the means of resolving them” (for example, the circulation and distribution that would make it possible to feed the world) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 468). All flows are submitted to the regime of exchange value, capitalism reterritorializes the lines of flight it has liberated from previous codes. An axiomatic binds all flows and keep them within the orbit of capitalism without requiring an outside force to intervene.

The states, by implication, have more limited role than it was in earlier regimes.”What characterizes our situation is both beyond and on this side of the state.”(Deleuze & Parnet 1987, p146). Perhaps the development of capitalism does not require the support of the state to the degree it did in the nineteenth century and in mid of the twentieth century. This does not follow that states will wither away. The state does overcode society in the service of capitalism. The state is not only in the service of capitalism; its overcoding touches on aspects of our lives that are irreducible to economics. And capitalism is not purely exploitative. The axiomatic that binds us to the market also sets

us free from the oppression of traditional social codes. The objective before Deleuze is to mobilize the deterritorialization that capitalism unleashes in the service of new ways of living together.

d. Schizoids and Freedom

Deleuze has offered us an ontology that manifests difference. He has carried that ontology into the realm of politics. In *Anti-Oedipus*, a distinction is drawn between *subject groups* and *subjected groups*. Both of them involve an investment of desire. However they involve very different investments. Each investment is collective; every fantasy is a group fantasy. This reflects a position of reality. But the two kinds of investment are fundamentally different, one bears upon the molar structures that subordinate the molecules, whereas the other bears upon the molecular multiplicities that subordinate the structured crowd phenomena. “One is a *subjected group* investment . . . which socially and psychically represses the desire of persons; the other, a *subject-group* investment in the transverse multiplicities that convey desire as a molecular phenomenon” .(Deleuze and Guattari, 1977, p. 280).

Subjected groups act and think in terms of molar lines. Their world comprises solely of actualities, which has nothing to do with virtualities that might be actualized. This is pure Nietzschean reactivity. But what Deleuze held about philosophy. “It is a question of someone – if only one – with the necessary modesty not managing to know what everybody knows.” This is where subject groups begin. With subject groups every investment is collective. We are never alone, whether in our molar lines or in our molecular lines. Some among *us* manage to be ignorant what the rest of us know. Subject groups are ignorant about what others know. They do not yet know what their bodies are capable of. It is unmasking new possibilities, new formations and creating new connections. “Every struggle is a function of all these undecidable propositions and constructs *revolutionary connections* in opposition to the *conjugations of the axiomatic*” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p473). Machines, by their very nature,

connect. They tend to create new connections with other machines. They seek to actualize new moments of the virtual.

Deleuze draws a contrast between nomads with sedentaries. Deleuze sides with the nomads, with those whose restlessness sends them on strange adventures. Nomads are ignorant. They seek to connect infinitely. They tend to palpate the virtual in their work in order to unveil what can be connected to it. Minorities are nomadic adventures. To become minor is to connect with neglected movements in the social body. These connections may be parental, culinary, scientific, linguistic, vocational, artistic, or literary. To become minor is not to accept and side with a particular identity. Moreover it has nothing to do with how many are in the group compared with the number in the majority. Becoming-woman is a becoming minor, irrespective of the fact if there are more women than men. To become minor is to come out of chains of the majority identity in order to palpate new possibilities, new ways of becoming that are no longer bound to the dominant molar lines and their abstract machines. It is to unlock the virtual whose vision is quite often obscured by the molar lines of the majority. It is to break with identity, which is always the identity of the majority, in favor of difference as yet to be actualized. As Deleuze and Guattari say of Kafka, “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language.” (Deleuze & Guattari 1986, p. 16). May elaborates that “Nomadism and minorities are not the activities solely of particular individuals banding together. They may be that, but they do not have to be. Nomadism and becoming-minor can happen across groups or even at a pre-individual level” (May 2005, p151).

Deleuze and Guattari point to the ways of conceiving and acting upon our experience in the following quote. “This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. . . . Connect, conjugate, continue:

a whole “diagram,” as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 161). What we are required to do now is think and act by means of them.

We do not get any general prescription. There are only analyses and experiments in a world that provides us no guarantees, because world is always other and more than we can imagine. We roll the dice; we never know for sure what will fall back. “Everything is played in uncertain games. . . . The question of the future of the revolution is a bad question because, in so far as it is asked, there are so many people who do not *become* revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place “ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987 p. 147).

This allows Deleuze & Guattari to the kind of personality type that has been notoriously resistant Freudian Psychoanalysis-schizophrenic type- in order to show the nature of pre-oedipal, instinctual energies sort of human being. “What the schizophrenic experiences, both as an individual and as a member of human species, is not at all any one aspect of nature, but nature as a process of production” (Deleuze & Guattari 1977, p3). The schizo has his own system of co-ordinates for sustaining himself at this disposal, because, first of all, he has at his disposal his very own recoding code, which does not coincide with the social code, or coincides with it only in order to parody it. The code of delirium or of desire proves to have an extraordinary fluidity. It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way (Deleuze & Guattari 1977, p15).

Schizophrenia, according to Deleuze & Guattari, refers to deterritorialized desire which is generated by capitalism and acknowledged by Deleuzean philosophy of difference. “They see schizophrenia in this sense not as an illness to be cured but as a value to be nurtured (Gutting 2001, p340). Gutting points

out that the problem is that capitalism restricts schizophrenic desire to either its economized or its oedipal form. He further notes that those who try to live out non-economised desires in the public realm are violently repressed and lead the lives of terror and frustration that define what is generally termed “schizophrenia”. The horror of such lives is real, but it is the product of the capitalist system, not an inevitable feature of deterritorialized desire. Deleuze & Guattari, according to Gutting, offer a “schizoanalysis” of capitalism designed to expose and help eliminate the arbitrariness of its constraints, thereby freeing the creative power of “schizophrenia” (Gutting 2001, p340).

e. Freedom and Becoming

French thought during the twentieth century has been concerned with individual freedom. “Individual freedom as a concrete, lived reality has maintained the distinctiveness of French philosophy (Gutting 2001, p380). The post-structuralists rejected the very philosophical tool with which existential phenomenology had explicated freedom. They questioned existential phenomenological descriptive and ontological methods. Similarly they challenged their central commitment to individual freedom. Gutting writes that the “very rejection expressed their commitment to individual freedom. The ethical and political goals of Deleuze flow from pre-philosophical commitment to individual freedom” (Gutting 2001, p388). Deleuze’s main objective is to unveil social conditions and attitudes that resist liberation. He is attempting to combat fascism, as Foucault writes “Not only historical fascism but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, p xiv-xv). Fascism is a force that terrorizes, rigidifies, oppresses, robs one of one’s personal territory, and silences. Deleuze conceives of “the prevailing social system as fascist to the extent that it is repressive of desire. As things stand, every society is fundamentally repressive” (Wicks 2003, p275).

Few post structuralists have been engaged in developing a positive philosophical understanding of freedom. They remain satisfied with a naive, pre-reflective commitment to the unquestionable status of transgression, novelty, plurality and difference as absolute ethical ideals. There is no inclination to raise difficult questions about the roots and limits of human freedom. The chief task is to expose and overcome all obstacles to its unrestricted expansion. So "Deleuze's ontology endorses this view unquestionably without stopping to ask just what it would consist of and why it is so important" (Gutting 2001,p389). He further elaborates "Post-structuralism is an interlude rather than a decisive turning in the history of French philosophy. It has been important for its questioning of limits and especially for its rejection of traditional philosophical claims to ultimate truth. But once its critiques are acknowledged, it is easy to see that it remains the fundamental twentieth century project of articulating the individual as a locus of freedom" (Gutting 2001, p390).

Baudrillard stated in 1996 that: the great philosophical question used to be "why is there something rather than nothing?" Today, according to him, the real question is "why is there nothing rather than something?"(Baudrillard 1996, p2). The resurfacing of existential worry shows the limitations of the quest for freedom. A quest that "one could call a "negative" quest to be "free from" oppressive forces" (Wicks 2003, p297). Wicks notes that Deleuze wanted freedom from instinctually restrictive Freudian and Oedipal family constellations, and from too tightly organized, fascistically terrorizing social structures. Hence he was engaged in the negative project of freedom.

All the quests for freedom are aimed to make the world a better place in which to be with oneself and with others in a self respecting way. This displays the biasedness of the inquiry rather than neutrality of it. Robert Wicks remarks that this quest is all fundamentally reactive to the given, foreground standing, oppressive situations, despite the contents of some of their visionary responses. He writes, "Freedom from" some dominating species of oppression is a weaker kind of freedom

than the “freedom to” exert one self in a direction that is defined more autonomously from a position of inner strength and solid self-determination (Wicks 2003, p297). Hence Deleuzean project of schizophrenic world is negative and weak.

f. Critical Evaluation

Deleuze had fantastic interpretive styles of thought. His vision of society was strong and unique. He developed his model of rhizomatic interaction at length. Wicks argues, however, that Deleuze may have fallen victim to his own intense vision. “There are reasons to believe that society is not uniformly structured like the rhizome and people are not simply machine like aggregates. There are recognizable dimensions of systematicity, rationality and organic unity in our daily experience (Wicks 2003,p276).

He is not the only French thinker of twentieth century subject to this kind of criticism. Deleuze takes the mechanical, alienated aspect of life to the extreme, and develops upon it a revolution friendly and liberation-aimed position. Wicks holds that “What is paradoxical about Deleuze’s antagonism to rigid thought structures, is the way his world of rhizome like structures is itself offered with a strong dose of dogmatic rigidity in its disregard for the systematic and organic aspects of experience” (Wicks 2003, p 277).

The Deleuzean quest for liberation, Wicks raises the question, conflicts with his model of society as an assemblage of desiring-machines. On Deleuze’s model, he further explicates the problem, the self is decentered, which is to say that it is difficult to say “who” it is that is the subject of liberation and freedom from paranoia, and fascism which is so pointedly sought. Deleuzean ontology disintegrates the subject of experience into a schizophrenic and depersonalized set of “desiring-machines”. His picture of human being thus tends to render the notion of personal freedom almost absurd. This leads to another problem whether the quest for freedom and liberation is consistent with those theories that advance the idea of the decentered self. Deleuze highlights this problem in a clear-cut way, because he is

straight forward about his conception of the human being as aggregate and as an essentially disintegrated and a non systematic kind of being. To be sure, one can romantically link the schizophrenic tendency toward shifting, movement, creativity and individuality with the idea of jazz improvisation, but there remains the question whether one can say meaningfully that anyone in particular is doing the improvising, since the sense of integrated personality has been so weakened and almost lost.

Deleuzean analysis and assessment leads us into a triple bind where, if we do not believe self deceptively that we are organically unified and integrated personalities, we are left to gravitate into either paranoid fascism, or schizophrenic insanity. Wicks notes that whatever path we choose within the theories internal options, we end up at a dead end, and thereby in the very state of mental frustration that has been known to generate schizophrenic states. He concludes "Deleuze's theory can therefore be seen as having itself been designed to drive us mad, so that we can experience what he regards as the truth" (Wicks 2003, p278).

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